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Caroline A. Veniero†
For decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has left open the question whether the
U.S. Constitution protects a right to some amount of education. While such a right
is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, advocates have long argued for
the existence of an implicit, fundamental right to a basic minimum education under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Recognition of such a right
requires grappling with the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.
To be a fundamental right, one requirement is that a proposed right have deep roots
in U.S. history and tradition. This Comment examines whether the right to a basic
minimum education—defined as basic literacy—is deeply rooted.
While courts differ in how they analyze whether a right is deeply rooted, they
all generally view the time around the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment as a relevant historical consideration. With a focus on that time period, this Comment analyzes two case studies: the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—
or “Freedmen’s Bureau”—and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In both cases, the federal government perceived a gap in local provision of education and responded
through these agencies with support for literacy education. In serving as a backstop
to local educational failures, the federal government’s actions ensured access to a
basic literacy education. This pattern of behavior provides support for the notion
that the right to a basic minimum education is deeply rooted.
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“There have been periods when the country heard with dismay
that ‘the soldier was abroad.’ That is not the case now. There is
another person abroad, a less important person, in the eyes of
some. The schoolmaster is abroad! And I trust more to him, armed
with his primer, than I do to the soldier in full military array, for
upholding and extending the liberties of the country.”
–Lord Brougham, The Schoolmaster Is Abroad, in THE
FREEDMEN’S THIRD READER 201, 201 (Boston, The American
Tract Society 1866).1
INTRODUCTION
For twenty-six days in 2020, all students in Ohio, Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Michigan could claim a fundamental right to a
“basic minimum education” under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
This exciting proclamation out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit—while only briefly binding law—marks the first
time a federal appeals court has recognized such a right. The

1
This reader proved to be a popular reader series used in classrooms in Reconstruction Era southern schools. JESSICA ENOCH, REFIGURING RHETORICAL EDUCATION: WOMEN
TEACHING AFRICAN AMERICAN, NATIVE AMERICAN, AND CHICANO/A STUDENTS, 1865–1911,
at 35 (2008).
2
Gary B. v. Whitmer (Gary B. I), 957 F.3d 616, 648 (6th Cir.), reh’g granted and
vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
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decision has reignited fervor for the recognition of some right to
education under the U.S. Constitution.
The case, Gary B. v. Whitmer,3 was a class action suit brought by
seven plaintiffs—all students in Detroit, Michigan—on behalf of
current and future schoolchildren in Detroit’s five worst-performing
schools. In a 136-page complaint, the plaintiffs pleaded facts regarding the abysmal condition of school buildings, lack of qualified
teachers, and failing test scores.4 Among other arguments, the
students alleged that the state officials had deprived them of their
right to education, specifically “their constitutionally-guaranteed
fundamental right of access to literacy.”5 State officials moved to
dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion
because it found there was no fundamental right to any education, including literacy education.6 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
disagreed.
Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that there
was a fundamental, implicit right to what the court termed a
“basic minimum education” under the Fourteenth Amendment.7
The court arrived at this novel conclusion by unpacking the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Mirroring
the Supreme Court’s methodology, the Sixth Circuit considered
education’s place in U.S. history and tradition. The court concluded that “the right to a basic minimum education . . . is so deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition as to meet the historical prong of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process test.”8
While the Sixth Circuit held that the U.S. Constitution protects a right to a basic minimum education, the court declined to
sketch out exactly what amount or kind of education this right
guarantees.9 Instead, the court decided that this inquiry would be
better suited to the district court on remand.10 However, the court

3
957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.), reh’g granted and vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020)
(en banc).
4
Class Action Complaint at 5–14, Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D.
Mich. 2018) (No. 2:16-cv-13292-SJM-APP).
5
Id. at 2.
6
Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 621.
7
Id. at 648. Judge Eric Murphy dissented from the panel decision, arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not grant affirmative rights. Id. at 663 (Murphy, J., dissenting). But see id. at 656–57 (majority opinion) (explaining that the Supreme Court “has
recognized affirmative fundamental rights” under the Fourteenth Amendment).
8
Id. at 652 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720–21 (1997)).
9
Id. at 659.
10 Id.
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did offer that this right would at least include—as the plaintiffs
had asserted—“an education sufficient to provide access to a foundational level of literacy.”11
As the first federal appeals court decision establishing such a
right, the Sixth Circuit’s holding was nothing short of groundbreaking.12 It was also short-lived. Soon after the court issued its
opinion, a Sixth Circuit judge—taking advantage of a local procedural rule—called for a poll of the other judges in the circuit to
see if the case would be reheard en banc.13 A majority of judges
voted for a rehearing, so the original opinion was vacated.14 Then,
before the court could rehear, the case settled.15 The Sixth Circuit
dismissed the rehearing as moot.16
While Gary B. is no longer binding law, the case remains of
immense interest and importance to supporters of a right to education under the U.S. Constitution, as it is an indication that arguments for this right are not meritless.17 Indeed, Gary B. is one
case in a long line of efforts to litigate a right to education.18 It is
almost certainly not the last case either, as U.S. schools still
struggle to teach skills like basic literacy to all students. Estimates indicate that one in five U.S. adults has low English literacy skills, and nearly one in twelve is functionally illiterate in
English.19
Attorneys litigating a federal right to education have their
work cut out for them, though, as they continue to face considerable obstacles. For starters, Supreme Court precedent presently
limits the extent to which any kind of federal right to education
can exist. Additionally, arguments for the existence of an implicit,
fundamental right require diving headfirst into the Supreme
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. A murky and
11

Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 659.
See History Is Made: Groundbreaking Settlement in Detroit Literacy Lawsuit, PUB.
COUNS. (May 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y23V-A9TH.
13 Gary B. v. Whitmer (Gary B. II), 958 F.3d 1216, 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
14 Id.
15 See Valerie Strauss, Michigan Settles Historic Lawsuit After Court Rules Students
Have a Constitutional Right to a ‘Basic’ Education, Including Literacy, WASH. POST (May
14, 2020), https://perma.cc/7CLD-9WRM.
16 Colter Paulson, Sixth Circuit Vacates Right-to-Literacy Ruling, NAT’L L. REV.
(June 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/2NVB-CS7W.
17 See, e.g., Mark Walsh, U.S. Appeals Court Recognizes a Federal Right of Access to
Literacy, EDUC. WK. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/BXY7-Y7FM.
18 For more information about this history, see generally Steve Smith, Education Adequacy Litigation: History, Trends, and Research, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 107 (2004).
19 Adult Literacy in the United States, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (July 2019),
https://perma.cc/257J-XEY6.
12
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“embattled area of constitutional law,” substantive due process
analysis remains in “a state of profound doctrinal confusion.”20
One common thread in the “conceptual chaos” of substantive
due process analysis is an eye toward history and tradition.21 Generally, courts ask whether a proposed right is “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition,”22 as the Sixth Circuit did. In
Gary B., the court held that education was deeply rooted in history based on education’s persistent and ever-expanding importance in American life.23
Critically though, how courts determine whether a right is
deeply rooted is not a settled matter. A court’s determination depends on what analytical framework and choices the judge
makes. One broad school of thought is that this analysis should
be expansive, tracing a right through history to see where it originates, as well as if and how it changes over time.24 Another broad
approach is to focus on the roots of a right at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification and enactment.25 With this approach to substantive due process analysis, the central question
is essentially: What did the amendment’s drafters and ratifiers
believe the amendment to protect?26
These two analytical methods are often in conflict with one
another. While the differences between these approaches are numerous, they have an obvious point of overlap: regardless of which
methodology a judge subscribes to, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enactment is relevant in determining whether a right is deeply
rooted. For some, of course, it is the only time period worth considering. For others, though—particularly followers of the expansive approach—the Amendment’s enactment is still an important
data point in U.S. history.
20 Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63,
65 (2006).
21 Id. at 66.
22 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
23 Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 652.
24 See, e.g., id. at 650 (“[T]his history should not be viewed as only a static point.”).
25 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 715–16 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26 See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979
(2012). While in the past decade the originalist view of this analysis has largely resided in
the Court’s dissents, there is reason to believe that may change. With the recent confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Court’s originalist contingent is solidified for
years to come. Moreover, the federal appellate and district court judges appointed by President Donald Trump have included a significant number of originalists. It would appear
originalism is now in vogue. See How Amy Coney Barrett Would Reshape the Court—and
the Country, POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/3A3F-8WUC.

986

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:983

While existing scholarship provides solid, enactment-focused
evidence supporting the deep roots of a right to education, it
largely focuses on the attitudes and actions of state actors and
state governments.27 Indeed, despite extensive scholarship that
makes the case for a federal right to education, few have explored
evidence that links the long-recognized importance of education28
with the federal government. This Comment seeks to address that
gap in scholarship. Specifically, this Comment explores whether
a right to education—one that at a minimum includes a right to
foundational literacy—is deeply rooted in U.S. history and tradition under an enactment-focused analysis of the federal government’s actions during that time.
Beginning in 1865—three years ahead of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification—and well into the 1870s, the federal
government perceived gaps in local provision of education and positioned itself as a backstop to local and state failures in educating citizens. This positioning is apparent in two key case studies,
both of which are largely unexplored by legal scholarship in the
context of a right to education. The first is the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—or “Freedmen’s Bureau” for
short. As a post–Civil War transition agency, the Freedmen’s Bureau responded to southern states’ deliberate failures to educate
their Black citizens by supporting the creation of schools that encouraged literacy.29 The second is the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
This agency founded compulsory boarding schools in response to
what it identified as a failure on behalf of tribes and private “benevolent organizations” to properly educate indigenous children.30
This Comment will explore how these case studies provide support for a deeply rooted right to some amount of education under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
To that end, this Comment will proceed in four parts. Part I
explores past efforts at litigating a fundamental right to education under the U.S. Constitution and parses out the obstacles to
establishing such a right. Part II lays out the role of the historical
prong in the Supreme Court’s substantive due process test and
highlights the value of enactment-focused evidence. Part III

27

See infra Part II.C.
For more on the Founders’ recognition of education’s importance, see Malhar
Shah, Comment, The Fundamental Right to Literacy: Relitigating the Fundamental Right
to Education After Rodriguez and Plyler, 73 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 129, 130–37 (2016).
29 See infra Part III.A.
30 See infra Part III.B.
28
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explores and examines each case study individually. Part IV
brings these case studies into conversation with one another.
Part IV also addresses the proverbial elephant in the room—the
highly colonialist motivations behind these federal actions. This
Comment concludes by arguing that, because of the actions the
federal government took, there is support for the right to education’s deep roots, even with an enactment-era focus.
I. THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
To understand present efforts to litigate a federal right to a
basic minimum education, it is helpful to understand what the
Supreme Court has already said about any potential right to education under the U.S. Constitution. However, before delving into
the Court’s precedent, one distinction is useful. Many famous
examples of right-to-education cases come out of state courts;
DeRolph v. State31 and Gannon v. State32 are two such cases.
These famed cases are significant in their own rights, but they
are distinct from the conversation about a right to education under the U.S. Constitution.33 Instead, DeRolph and Gannon proceeded based on the educational provisions of their respective
state constitutions.34 Using such provisions, litigants have
brought challenges to state decisions like school funding, alleging
that these actions violate students’ educational rights under the
relevant provision of the state’s constitution.35 In contrast, efforts
to litigate a right to education under the U.S. Constitution are
based on the Fourteenth Amendment. While the specifics of how
such a right could even derive from the Fourteenth Amendment
are discussed in Part II, it is sufficient for now to note that cases

31 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). For more information on the aftermath of the
DeRolph decision, see generally Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road
to an Adequate Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83.
32 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014). For more information on the various stages of the
decades-long educational adequacy litigation in Kansas, see generally Caroline DiBartolomeo, Comment, State Constitutional Law—Education Finance—The Ongoing Battle
for Adequate School Funding in the State of Kansas. Gannon v. State, 390 P.3d 461 (Kan.
2017), 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1257 (2019).
33 For a discussion of the developments of this movement in state courts, see Barry
Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 92, 121–32 (2013).
34 An educational provision can be found in every single state constitution, but the
guarantees of those provisions vary by state. EMILY PARKER, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE
STATES, 50-STATE REVIEW: CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 1
(2016), https://perma.cc/XZA4-K5D3.
35 See Friedman & Solow, supra note 33, at 121–32.
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like DeRolph and Gannon do not bear on the question whether a
federal right to education exists because they do not implicate the
U.S. Constitution.36
Focusing then on a right to education under the U.S. Constitution, this Part will unpack what the Supreme Court has said—
and has not said—about this proposed right. Part I.A explores the
Court’s repeated emphasis on education’s importance leading up
to 1973. Part I.B describes what changed in 1973—namely, how
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez37 foreclosed
a broad, generalized right to education. Finally, Part I.C unpacks
Rodriguez’s aftershocks. It shows that, although the Court rejected a broad educational right in Rodriguez, the Court has since
acknowledged that whether a right to some minimum amount of
education exists is still an open question.
A. Early Cases: The Supreme Court Emphasizes Education’s
Importance
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the importance
of education to American life. In 1923, less than a decade after
the advent of compulsory schooling, the Supreme Court noted in
Meyer v. Nebraska38 that “[t]he American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.”39 Such a
longstanding attitude, the Court went on, could be traced back to
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.40 This foundational document
provided that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”41 Because education occupied such an important position in American
life, the Court determined that teachers’ “right [ ] to teach and the
right of parents to engage [them] so to instruct their children . . .
36 One may wonder why it is useful to pursue a right to education under the Fourteenth Amendment if state constitutions already confer such a right. Two considerations
are worth noting. First, in a nation with such uneven educational provision, additional
protections—particularly protections that implicate the federal government as a distinct,
additional system of enforcement—are valuable. Second, not all state educational provisions are created equal. Some state constitutions do not explicitly protect a certain quality
of education or anything beyond the mere provision of public schools. See PARKER, supra
note 34, at 5–22.
37 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39 Id. at 400.
40 Id.
41 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, art. 3, 1 Stat. 50, 52.
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are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”42 With
this conclusion, the Court ultimately held in Meyer that Nebraska’s law prohibiting foreign language instruction—a vestige
of post–World War I xenophobia43—was an unconstitutional exercise of state power.44
This acknowledgement of education’s importance was not a
one-off incident. In 1954, in the landmark case Brown v. Board of
Education,45 the Supreme Court once again opined on the ingrained importance of education in American life. Striking down
school segregation laws as unconstitutional, the Court wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship.46
Here, the Court not only reiterated education’s importance;
it connected that importance to the “very foundation” of citizenship and democratic society more broadly. The Court also
acknowledged some additional functions of education, including
“awakening the child to cultural values, [ ] preparing him for later
professional training, and [ ] helping him to adjust normally to
his environment.”47 Given the multitude of functions education
serves, the Court expressed doubt that “any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.”48 In connecting education with both societal and
democratic function, the Court positioned education as a near essential in American life.
Again, in 1972, the Court reaffirmed the importance of basic
education to performing the functions of citizenry. In Wisconsin v.

42

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
See Allen Pusey, Justices Hear a Challenge to ‘English-Only’ Laws, 103 A.B.A. J.
72, 72 (2017).
44 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
45 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46 Id. at 493.
47 Id.
48 Id. While the Court lauded education, it notably did not base Brown on the conclusion that school segregation laws violated students’ fundamental right to education.
43
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Yoder,49 the Court had to decide whether the state could compel
Amish parents to send their children to secondary school.50 Although
the Court ultimately held that the state could not, the Court emphasized that Amish parents had no objections to their children
attending elementary school to learn critical skills like reading.51
Moreover, the Court agreed with state officials “that some degree
of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom and independence.”52
While none of these cases speak squarely to a right to education under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in each case
emphasized a longstanding national value on education in order
to explain its decision. In Meyer and Brown, the importance of
education underscored the Court’s decision to strike down restrictions on education. In Yoder, the agreement between the parties that education is important insofar as it teaches critical skills
like reading served to cabin the reach of the Court’s decision. In
all of these cases, the Court treated the historical and traditional
importance of education as a near given. Yet despite the Court’s
continued recognition of education’s importance, the question
whether the Constitution protects a student’s right to education
did not reach the Court until 1973.
B. A Blow to a Broad Right: San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez
While the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Yoder, a
monumental legal challenge was brewing in the south of Texas.
After San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
right-to-education advocates could no longer plausibly argue that
the Fourteenth Amendment protected a broad, generalized right
to education.
Demetrio Rodriguez, a sheet-metal welder residing in San
Antonio, sent his children to the local Edgewood public schools.53
He and other parents in the district noticed a disturbing trend in
their children’s education. Edgewood—a district that served

49

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 221.
51 Id. at 211–12.
52 Id. at 221.
53 Michael Heise, The Story of San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez:
School Finance, Local Control, and Constitutional Limits, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 51,
52–53 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
50
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predominantly children of color and low-income families—could
afford to spend about $356 per pupil each year.54 In contrast, the
Alamo Heights district—a nearby district that served predominantly white, affluent students—spent about two-thirds more per
pupil.55 This difference existed despite the fact that Edgewood
taxed its property at a higher percentage than Alamo Heights
did.56 Attempts to raise tax rates in the district even further to
make up for the difference in per pupil spending in Edgewood
could not succeed, as state law imposed a ceiling on property taxes.57
Rodriguez and other families brought a challenge to the
state’s funding system on behalf of Texas schoolchildren residing
in districts with low property values. Rather than challenging the
system under state law, the plaintiffs asserted that Texas’s funding system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a state from “deny[ing] to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”58 Accordingly, when a law classifies or distinguishes between people who have been “historically subject to discrimination or political powerlessness,” that classification is “suspect,”
and courts will review that law with strict scrutiny, making it incredibly difficult for the law to survive.59
Here, the plaintiffs argued that Texas’s school funding system classified based on wealth and that wealth was a suspect
classification meriting strict scrutiny review. Additionally, the
plaintiffs argued that strict scrutiny was warranted because the
classification implicated a fundamental interest—namely, education.60 A three-judge panel in the Western District of Texas found
both arguments to be persuasive and, using an injunction, “restrained and enjoined . . . the operation of” the school finance laws
“insofar as they discriminate[d] against plaintiffs and others on
the basis of wealth.”61 The panel also ordered “that defendants . . .

54

Id. at 53.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59 See Selene C. Vázquez, Note, The Equal Protection Clause & Suspect Classifications: Children of Undocumented Entrants, 51 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 63, 64–65 (2020).
60 Heise, supra note 53, at 54, 56; see also Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.,
337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
61 Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 285.
55
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restructure the financial system in such a manner as not to violate the equal protection provision[ ].”62
Texas appealed the panel’s judgment directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.63 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
district court panel and admonished the panel’s failure to appreciate “the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions
posed by appellees’ challenge to Texas’ system of school financing.”64 First, the Court held that wealth was not a suspect classification that implicated the Equal Protection Clause.65 Second,
critically, the Court found there was no fundamental right to education because it “is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis
for saying it is implicitly so protected.”66
With these words, the Supreme Court closed the door on a
general “right to education” under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But upon closing that door, the Court opened a window. Even
though the Court held that there is no broad-reaching, general
right to education under the U.S. Constitution, the Rodriguez
Court did hypothesize that some minimum amount of education
could be fundamental and thus protected. The Court wrote, “Even
if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education
is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [other constitutional rights,] we have no indication that
the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide
an education that falls short.”67 Because no such showing was
made, the Court did not address whether such a right actually
exists. In the years since Rodriguez, the Court has given small hints
of what that “identifiable quantum of education” might entail.
The Court has done so primarily by confirming what pleadings
are insufficient to implicate that minimum quantum of education.
C. A Constitutional Right to Education After Rodriguez
Since Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has occasionally revisited what that “identifiable quantum of education” looks like, but
the issue has largely been treated incidentally and indirectly.

62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 285–86.
Heise, supra note 53, at 59.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36–37.
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Take, for instance, Papasan v. Allain.68 In that case, Mississippi
students and school officials in 23 counties brought suit against
various state officials, alleging unlawful denial of “economic benefits of public school lands granted by the United States to the
State of Mississippi well over 100 years ago.”69
To understand the plaintiffs’ claim, one must understand the
history and purpose of these land grants. In 1785, Congress—in
positioning the nation for westward expansion—established requirements for surveying and selling the Northwest Territory.70
One of those requirements was that each township reserve the
sixteenth section of its territory to be held in trust by the state for
the benefit of public schools.71 The state then had a fiduciary duty
to maximize the benefits of the trust by leasing and selling the
land at fair market value.72 In Mississippi though, the Chickasaw
Nation held the state’s northern lands.73 As a result, no public
school land could be set aside in that portion of the state.74 However, in 1832, the Chickasaw Nation ceded its lands to the state.75
All of these lands were sold to private parties, and no Sixteenth
Section lands were retained by the state.76 Instead, the state set
aside “lieu lands” for the benefit of students in the so-called
Chickasaw Counties.77 Those lands were eventually sold to invest
in state railroads, but those railroads were destroyed in the Civil
War.78 To compensate the Chickasaw Counties for the missing
land grants, the state paid them from a fund, but that payment
did not nearly equal the funding that land grants generated for
students in the rest of Mississippi.79 Accordingly, as part of their
claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the unequal funding between different areas of the state deprived the students in the Chickasaw
Counties of their right to a minimally adequate education.80

68

478 U.S. 265 (1986).
Id. at 267–68.
70 C. Maison Heidelberg, Note, Closing the Book on the School Trust Lands, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 1581, 1584 (1992).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1586.
73 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 271.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 272.
77 Heidelberg, supra note 70, at 1586 n.21.
78 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 272.
79 Id. at 273.
80 Id. at 274.
69
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The Supreme Court rejected this contention. Writing for the
Court, Justice Byron White dismissed the plaintiffs’ allegations
in the complaint as mere legal conclusions lacking sufficient factual support. He noted that the complaint did not allege that students in these counties were “not taught to read or write; they
d[id] not allege that they receive[d] no instruction on even the educational basics.”81 Because the plaintiffs “allege[d] no actual
facts in support of their assertion that they have been deprived of
a minimally adequate education,” the Court found that it could
disregard their claim.82
While Papasan did not resolve the question whether there is
a fundamental right to some amount of education, the Court’s
opinion is important in two ways. First, it gave an indication of
what facts could support a claim that one’s right to some amount
of education had been violated. Clearly, grave educational malpractice must occur. Second, the case confirmed that whether the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to some minimal
amount of education is still an open question after Rodriguez.83
Indeed, rather than dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim because there
is no such right, the Court merely noted that the pleadings were
insufficient to implicate any potential right. With the possibility
of this right still on the table, test cases attempting to establish
that right—like Gary B.— still appear on federal dockets today.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND HISTORICAL TRADITION
In bringing those cases, advocates for a right to education not
only run up against the limits of Supreme Court precedent; they
also encounter obstacles in the Court’s jurisprudence surrounding
substantive due process analysis. This Part lays out those obstacles and focus on one in particular—the Court’s historical inquiry.
Part II.A provides a brief overview of substantive due process
analysis generally, including the requirement that courts consider U.S. history and tradition. Part II.B explores the varying
approaches to this historical inquiry and identifies a point of commonality between these approaches. Finally, Part II.C lays out
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Id. at 286.
Id.
83 See Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 642 (“While the Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed
this issue, it has never decided it, and the question of whether such a right exists remains
open today.”); see also Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1059, 1061–62 (2019).
82

2021]

Education’s Deep Roots

995

how an enactment-focused study of federal involvement in literacy education would aid followers of both approaches.
A. Substantive Due Process: An Overview
Substantive due process derives from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 The Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”85 The clause thus offers
procedural protection. However, courts also interpret this clause
to mean that some rights are so substantial that the government
cannot restrict them without a compelling state interest, no matter how much procedure is in place.86 These substantive rights include those listed in the Bill of Rights as well as implicit, “fundamental” rights.87 Over time, the Supreme Court has recognized
that fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause include
the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right to bodily integrity, and more.88
Determining what constitutes a fundamental right is challenging. As an initial matter, courts proceed with extreme reluctance when litigants request recognition of a new fundamental
right.89 Recognizing new fundamental rights can lead to criticism
that the court is improperly legislating.90 Beyond these critiques,
the proper analysis to undertake when determining whether a
right is fundamental is unclear. The Supreme Court has asserted
there is no set formula for determining what is a fundamental
right.91
Washington v. Glucksberg92 is the closest the Court has ever
come to establishing a definitive test for new fundamental rights.

84

Conkle, supra note 20, at 65–66.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86 Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 643.
87 Id.
88 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (collecting cases).
89 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general
matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended.” (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–
26 (1985))).
90 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
91 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, ‘has not been reduced to any formula.’” (quoting Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
92 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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In this case, the Court considered whether a law prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide implicated a fundamental right. To determine whether the “right to assistance in committing suicide”
is fundamental, the Court considered the “two primary features”
of its “established method of substantive-due-process analysis.”93
The first feature is twofold: “[T]he Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
[(a)] objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and [(b)] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”94
The second feature is ensuring “a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”95 Conceptualizing a right to
education thus requires engaging with each feature of this test.
This Comment focuses solely on the first prong of that first
feature—an analysis of whether the proposed right is “objectively,
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” This inquiry
has been dubbed “the historical prong of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process test.”96 True, support for the historical prong
is not dispositive, and deep roots in history and tradition do not
supplant the utility of additional scholarship establishing the
other requirements.97 However, whether a right to education fulfills the historical prong is hotly contested and thus goes a long
way in establishing this right. The next Section will delve into
what it means for a right to be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and how different judges grapple with that
question.
B. How to Determine Whether a Right Is Deeply Rooted
When confronted with a standard like the “deeply rooted”
consideration, a natural follow-up question is: How does a court
know if a right is deeply rooted? Like many legal standards, the
answer is not totally clear.
93

Id. at 720, 726.
Id. at 720–21 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and then quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
95 Id. at 721 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
96 Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 652 (“[W]e find that the right to a basic minimum education . . .
meet[s] the historical prong of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process test.”).
97 Interestingly, while scholarship addresses both additional requirements, whether
the right to education is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty receives far more scholarly attention than whether this right is carefully described. See, e.g., Shah, supra note
28, at 137 (arguing that a right to literacy is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty).
94
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To understand how courts analyze an asserted right’s historical roots, it can be helpful to think about why history merits consideration in substantive due process analysis at all. The primary
rationale for doing so is largely rooted in judicial restraint.98 By
limiting fundamental rights to those that are longstanding and
recognizable in American life, “judges of diametrically opposed
opinions on the wisdom or justice of [a] challenged law should
reach the same legal conclusion, since the decision will hinge on
objective historical fact rather than on normative judgment.”99
Unsurprisingly though, judges do find themselves able to disagree about a whole host of historical claims. This disagreement
likely stems from the reality that the idea of “objective historical
facts” is dually misleading here. First, “objective historical facts”
are not always easy to come by. More importantly, historical facts
are only pieces of the historical analysis, not the analysis itself.
Judges can agree that a particular action occurred but disagree
on what the implications of that action are.100 In this sense, the
historical analysis provides minimal judicial restraint.101
Judges do agree that the “deeply rooted” question is a historical inquiry. Yet in endeavoring to answer whether a proposed
right is deeply rooted, a principal source of disagreement among
judges is how to conduct that historical analysis. There is unfortunately no guidebook. Different judges espouse different methodologies, and this results in a number of unclear points.
One major uncertainty in this realm is what kind of evidence
to consult. At various points, the Supreme Court has considered
many different types of evidence. Supreme Court precedent on
this historical analysis includes the use of quotes from past cases,
brief tours through ancient Roman law, and considerations of
briefs from historians.102 However, the Supreme Court does not

98 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (“Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and
practices thus provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decision-making that direct
and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.” (quotation marks and citation
omitted) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125)).
99 Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997
UTAH L. REV. 665, 672.
100 Judges can also fall victim to “law office history”—a derogatory term employed by
historians when lawyers or judges cherry-pick certain quotations or happenings to support
a given legal argument. Law office history can prove “manipulable.” Thomas Hilbink,
Schooling: History as Handmaiden, 5 LAW, CULTURE & HUMANS. 43, 44–47 (2009).
101 See John C. Toro, The Charade of Tradition-Based Substantive Due Process, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 172, 181–94 (2009).
102 See id. at 181–86.
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prescribe what evidence one must consult when examining
whether an asserted right is deeply rooted.
The temporal limits on what evidence one can use are also
not uniform. Should evidence of a right’s deep roots be limited to
the time surrounding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should there be any limits at all? These questions are unsettled, and judges frequently disagree.103 To better understand
these methodological disagreements, consider a more recent substantive due process case: Obergefell v. Hodges.104
1. Differing methodologies in Obergefell.
Obergefell exemplifies how, in recent years, the Court has
taken an expansive approach to its historical analysis by tracing
proposed rights through history.105 This method definitionally requires drawing on sources that span decades or even centuries.
Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy explained, “History
and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its
outer boundaries. . . . When new insight reveals discord between
the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”106 With this approach
in mind, the Court began its historical analysis with “the dawn of
history,” tracing the importance of marriage through “the annals
of human history,” starting “[f]rom their beginning to their most
recent page.”107 With this sizeable scope, the Court consulted evidence from Confucius, Cicero, William Blackstone, and more.108
Using this evidence, the Court particularly emphasized the connections these thinkers made between marriage and civilized
society.109 The Court ultimately held that the fundamental right
to marry—a deeply rooted tradition—included the right to marry
someone of the same sex.110
103 See Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and Discretionary Traditionalism,
66 SMU L. REV. 841, 847 (2013).
104 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
105 See Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 643–44.
106 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. Some scholars argue that Obergefell effectively overrules Glucksberg, but this interpretation is controversial. See Ronald Turner, W(h)ither
Glucksberg?, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 209–16 (2020) (describing and rejecting such contentions). Of course, even assuming arguendo that Obergefell’s approach
supplants that of Glucksberg, tradition and history remain relevant, even if they do not
totally control the fundamental rights inquiry.
107 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–94.
108 Id. at 2594–96.
109 Id. at 2594.
110 Id. at 2607–08.
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In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia railed against the majority’s use of such expansive evidence in its historical analysis. In
doing so, he espoused a completely different evidentiary limit.
Justice Scalia wrote that the Court had “no basis for striking
down a practice that is not expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s text, and that bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use dating back to
the Amendment’s ratification.”111 For Justice Scalia, the focus
ought to be on “[w]hen the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
in 1868.”112 Thus, the fact that “it is unquestionable that the People who ratified that provision did not understand it to prohibit a
practice that remained both universal and uncontroversial in the
years after ratification” was determinative.113
Of course, this time stamp of “ratification” is itself not so definite as it may appear. While the Fourteenth Amendment was officially enacted in 1868, ratification is a process rather than a single
moment in time. Proposals for the Fourteenth Amendment can be
traced to a proposal before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction in 1865, and the amendment in its final form did not receive
the requisite approval from both houses of Congress until June
13, 1866.114 After that, it took another two years for enough states
to ratify the amendment, and it became the law of the land on
July 9, 1868.115 Unsurprisingly, though, the people who ratified
that amendment—both in the U.S. Congress and in the states—
continued to serve as legislators and continued to live their lives
after the amendment process concluded. Their beliefs on the
amendment did not begin and end in 1868. Thus, their actions—
even those beyond 1868—continue to offer meaningful insight
into the amendment. As a result, evaluating an asserted right’s
deep roots—even at the time of ratification, as Justice Scalia suggested—is not so clearly a focus on 1868 as it is a focus on the
Reconstruction Era more generally.

111

Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113 Id.
114 On This Day, Congress Approved the 14th Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June
13, 2020), https://perma.cc/V34A-U2KE.
115 Landmark
Legislation: The Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. SENATE,
https://perma.cc/FRL3-7HQP.
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2. The methodological overlap.
Reading the majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent together, Obergefell exemplifies two opposing theories of the historical inquiry. Justice Kennedy presents a far-reaching, holistic
analysis of history that consequently draws on historical sources
from a wide array of time periods. In contrast, Justice Scalia offers an enactment-focused analysis with strict temporal limits.
Proponents of each method can point to a number of shortcomings
in the opposing approach. Followers of the expansive method critique the enactment-focused analysis as unnecessarily restrictive.116 Conversely, those who focus on the ratification and enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment denounce the holistic
approach as bad history with a present bias.117 Neither approach
commands the full support of each member of the Court.118
While these two theories are clearly different, they overlap in
their view of the enactment’s relevance in conducting this analysis. In Justice Scalia’s dissent, this is easy to see. Indeed—to paraphrase William Shakespeare—for him, the enactment’s the
thing.119 However, even within Justice Kennedy’s more holistic
approach, the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment surely
falls somewhere between the first and last pages of the “annals of
human history.” Therefore, evidence from when the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted is useful in a holistic analysis as well.
Thus, for right-to-education advocates, an enactment-focused
analysis of education is useful no matter what methodology a
judge they encounter subscribes to.

116 See, e.g., Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 650 (“[T]his history should not be viewed as only a
static point.”).
117 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 555 (2012).
118 Cf. Richard S. Myers, Obergefell and the Future of Substantive Due Process, 14
AVE MARIA L. REV. 54, 68 (2016) (noting that substantive due process outcomes are not
inevitable as “[m]uch depends on the Court’s personnel at the time the issue comes before
the Justices”).
119 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2, l. 593 (Oxford 1987) (“The play’s the
thing.”).
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C. An Enactment Focus on the Right to a Basic Minimum
Education
1. Previous scholarship.
While the time around the amendment’s enactment is relevant no matter the methodology, there is nonetheless little scholarship laying out the enactment-focused case for a deeply rooted
right to education. That is why this Comment will place its focus
there. True, scholars like Professors Steven Calabresi and Sarah
Agudo have argued that the right is deeply rooted based on an
examination of state constitutions around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment.120 In their extensive survey on
what rights are deeply rooted, education made the list, with
thirty-six out of thirty-seven states including some right to education in their state constitutions.121 As Calabresi and Agudo theorized, a right to public education “may be at least one very fundamental positive-law entitlement that all Americans have long
possessed.”122 Professor Derek Black has similarly argued for the
right to education’s deep roots at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enactment. In his article, The Fundamental Right
to Education, Black establishes himself as the “first to offer an
originalist argument for a fundamental right to education.”123 He
thus examines the asserted right to education during the Founding and around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment.124 When analyzing the right during the 1860s, Black notes
that immediately after the amendment’s enactment, Congress explicitly premised rebellious states’ readmission to the Union in
part on whether they introduced educational clauses into their
state constitutions.125 In connecting education with readmission,
Black argues that the framers of the Amendment positioned education as a critical facet of a republican government, thereby evidencing the right to education’s deep roots at the time of the enactment.126 Black also examines the constitutional conventions

120 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 108 (2008).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Black, supra note 83, at 1063.
124 Id. at 1063–64.
125 Id. at 1063.
126 Id. at 1067.
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held in the southern states to rewrite their state constitutions.127
Based on the notes of those constitutional conventions, he concludes that delegates “consistently acknowledged that their task
was to create a republican form of government and that education
was a necessary component of that government.”128
While scholars like Calabresi, Agudo, and Black all provide
valuable insights into education’s deep roots at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, their evidence largely focuses on the states. Enacting an amendment requires state and
federal actors. Yet, while state constitutions and state constitutional conventions illuminate the attitudes of key state actors,
they do not tell us much about the federal government’s actions.
This Comment seeks to remedy that by analyzing two key federal,
enactment-era programs: the Freedmen’s Bureau’s support for
southern schools after the Civil War and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs’ creation of compulsory boarding schools for indigenous
children.
2. Terminology.
Before undertaking an enactment-focused analysis of this
right’s historical roots, a clarification of scope and terms is helpful. Because a general right to education is foreclosed by Rodriguez, this Comment focuses on whether—as the Supreme Court
hypothesized—“some identifiable quantum of education” is
deeply rooted.129 For ease of terminology, this Comment refers to
this minimum amount of education that the Fourteenth Amendment could conceivably protect as “a basic minimum education.”
Similarly, when discussing the right to that education, this Comment uses the term “a right to a basic minimum education.” Scholarly literature and courts occasionally depart from this language,
opting for “minimally adequate education,” but this term can be
somewhat confusing as it also appears frequently in state rightto-education cases where state constitutional provisions often
guarantee an education that is “adequate.”130 Instead, because
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Id. at 1090.
Black, supra note 83, at 1090 (citation omitted).
129 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36. Notably, in conducting this historical analysis, Rodriguez is of limited value. Rodriguez predates Glucksberg, and thus, while the Court
acknowledged the importance of education, it did not explore the proposed right’s historical roots.
130 For a comparison of educational provisions in state constitutions, see generally
PARKER, supra note 34.
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recent efforts at litigating this right at the federal level use the
term “basic minimum education,” this Comment follows suit.
Beyond the term itself, what this “basic minimum education”
could entail is not settled, as discussed in Part I. However, for the
sake of argumentative clarity, this Comment assumes that that
right at the very least encompasses, as the Sixth Circuit suggested, “a foundational level of literacy.”131
Why the focus on literacy? First, this approach is in line with
the obvious notion that literacy skills are required in nearly every
aspect of modern life, from filling out a job application to paying
taxes and voting. Indeed, “[t]he importance of literacy in modern
society cannot be over-emphasized.”132 The Supreme Court
acknowledged as much in its previous education cases, as Part I.A
explores in detail. Yet despite this wide recognition of literacy’s
importance, current estimates indicate that one in five U.S.
adults has a low level of English literacy, and nearly one in twelve
is functionally illiterate in English.133 Thus, an exploration of
whether a right to an education that includes foundational literacy exists is a timely, pressing question.
More critically though, this approach is in line with the
Court’s conceptualization of what amount of education could feasibly be protected by the U.S. Constitution. In Rodriguez, the
Court rejected plaintiffs’ claims and noted that they had not
claimed—nor could they—that Texas’s funding system “fail[ed] to
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal
skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of
full participation in the political process.”134 The Court did not
specify what those “basic minimal skills” entailed, but basic literacy is implicit in that description. The centrality of literacy to this
potential right to a basic minimum education also receives discussion in Papasan; there, the Court found it relevant that “[t]he petitioners do not allege that schoolchildren in the Chickasaw Counties are not taught to read or write” in determining that the
petitioners failed to allege facts to support their contention that
the state violated their fundamental right to some minimum
131

Gary B. I, 957 F.3d at 659.
Literacy’s importance to everyday activities is not the only reason it is so critical.
A lack of functional literacy can not only hinder a person’s ability to perform these critical
activities, but it can also negatively affect other cognitive skills like memory, attention,
and calculation. Roger T. Wilson, Literacy and Its Significance in Modern Life, 13
COLLEAGUES 9, 10 (2016).
133 Adult Literacy in the United States, supra note 19.
134 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
132
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amount of education.135 Thus, if the Court were to find that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected the right to a basic minimum
education, basic literacy would certainly be included.
III. INTRODUCING THE CASE STUDIES
This Comment explores two key federal actions around the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment: the educational
support provided by the Freedmen’s Bureau and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs’ creation of compulsory boarding schools for indigenous children. This Part explores how these federal programs
began, how they operated, and to what extent literacy education
played a role.
Before undertaking those case studies, one may wonder why
the case study method is a valuable means of performing this
analysis at all. The reasoning lies partly in pragmatism and
partly in historical methodology. To the former, case studies offer
a reasonable scope to an otherwise unwieldy analysis. Even for
judges who only consider the time around the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, there is a lot of potential evidence to consider—state constitutions, state ratification conventions, and
legislative history are just a few. Expand that to fit the needs of
a judge who takes a holistic approach, and the scope quickly becomes overwhelming. Case studies offer clear parameters and
save the discussion from spiraling into a multivolume encyclopedia. Beyond the practical considerations, the case study method
also finds support in historical practice. Historians routinely
adopt narrow foci to answer big questions.136 That is because there
is immense value in exploring a topic in greater depth and in relation to important context informing that moment. Indeed, without this context, one runs the risk of falling into the trap of “law
office history.”137 Thus, this Comment seeks not only to explore
the actions of these federal agencies in depth, but to offer important historical context along the way.
In a similar vein, one may wonder why these federal actions
are valuable case studies to analyze. In a historical analysis, the
selection of evidence is crucial. These two examples are valuable
135

Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.
A well-known example is an article by Professor Wendy Anne Warren, which focuses on one paragraph in a seventeenth-century colonial travelogue to demonstrate the
flaws in historical accounts of that period. See generally Wendy Anne Warren, “The Cause
of Her Grief”: The Rape of a Slave in Early New England, 93 J. AM. HIST. 1031 (2007).
137 See supra note 100.
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because, unlike state constitutions138 or state ratification convention notes139 tackled by previous scholars, these case studies provide largely unexplored links between the federal government—
the same government that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment—
and literacy education. While evidence of state and local attitudes
toward an asserted right allows us to understand the people and
the states that ratified the amendment, they do not tell us much
about the federal legislature that initially crafted it. Importantly,
like any governmental body, the federal government is not a monolithic entity with uniform thoughts and opinions. Still, the actions undertaken by the federal government as a whole provide
valuable information on whether an asserted right truly has deep
roots that can be traced to the time of the enactment.140
A. The Freedmen’s Bureau
Just two months before General Robert E. Lee’s famous surrender at Appomattox Court House, the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands—“Freedmen’s Bureau”—was
born through an act of Congress.141 The more recognizable, shortened name reflects the Bureau’s primary focus; “freedmen” referred to the millions of Black Americans who had been enslaved
and were set to finally be recognized under the law as citizens.
The Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865142 established the Bureau for
one year and gave the Bureau authority over “supervision and
management of all abandoned lands, and the control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel states . . . under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the head
of the bureau and approved by the President.”143 What “control of
all subjects” entailed was not specified. In practice, the Bureau
served as transitional support after the end of the Civil War. The
Bureau split the eleven rebel states into districts, creating and
maintaining local offices in each district as well as a central office
in Washington, D.C.144 At its peak, the Bureau employed about
nine hundred agents to carry out its work.145 These Bureau agents
138

See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 120, at 108.
See Black, supra note 83, at 1090.
140 Cf. Conkle, supra note 20, at 134 n.398 (noting that congressional action is relevant to determining evolving national values).
141 Freedmen’s Bureau, HISTORY (Oct. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/LC6G-WRTA.
142 Ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507.
143 Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865 § 1, 13 Stat. at 507–08.
144 Freedmen’s Bureau, supra note 141.
145 Id.
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performed a number of functions in the South. They maintained
freedmen’s courts, performed marriages, and attempted to procure basic necessities like food and housing.146 Famously, the Bureau also supported the establishment of schools. This educational role would define much of the Bureau’s work and legacy.147
While much is notable about the Bureau’s educational role, this
Section focuses on two key takeaways. First, this Section explores
how the organization of the Freedmen’s Bureau’s Education Division enabled literacy education and educational outreach more
generally. Second, this Section highlights the longevity of the Bureau’s educational function and Congress’s positioning of educational provision as a requirement for the Bureau’s dissolution.
1. The Education Division’s organization.
The value the Bureau placed on education is evidenced by the
organization of its Education Division. In this context, the meaning of “organization” is twofold. The Bureau was organized in the
sense that its Education Division had a sophisticated, hierarchical
structure that enabled wide outreach in the South. It was also
organized in the sense that it created and maintained detailed
records on this structure and its operations.
The structure of the Bureau’s Education Division tracked
closely with the structure of the Bureau at large. Each district
had a superintendent of education who reported to the superintendent in the Bureau’s Washington, D.C., office. Reports were
due from each district’s superintendent of education on the first
of every month, even during the summer when most schools were
out of session.148
The meticulousness of the Bureau’s educational recordkeeping is notable. These records not only tracked the number of
schools in a district, but they also collected detailed information
about the pupils in attendance. The Bureau went so far as to
146 See id.; AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 42 (1998).
147 See ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1877, at 65 (1990)
(“Bureau schools nonetheless helped lay the foundation for Southern public education.
Education probably represented the agency’s greatest success in the postwar South.”).
148 During the summer months, the reports generally included a remark about how
many schools were closed for the season. See, e.g., BUREAU OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN, AND
ABANDONED LANDS, REPORT OF SCHOOLS IN ALABAMA FOR MONTH OF AUGUST, 1866
(1866), microformed on Records of the Education Division of the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865–1871, Roll 15 (Nat’l Archives) [hereinafter Records of the Education Division].
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compile and maintain records of students enrolled in literacy classes specifically.149 In fact, rather than just maintaining a tally of
the number of students enrolled in general “literacy” classes, the
districts would track the level of literacy education being received: from classes on the alphabet and syllables to advanced
reader classes.150 To be sure, schools supported by the Bureau
taught a number of subjects, including geography, arithmetic,
and needlework.151 Common across all districts though was literacy education. Classes were available for early readers and advanced readers alike. That the Bureau tracked enrollment in literacy by level is further support that reading was especially
important. This focus is unsurprising given the recognized role of
literacy in religious and political life and the fact that teaching
Black people to read had been criminalized in much of the antebellum South.152
In some districts, the data collection form changed to include
an additional area for the state superintendent of education to
note the number of “places now destitute where schools might be
organized” as well as the number of “pupils (estimated) who
would attend such schools.”153 In these districts, the Bureau was
not only monitoring the performance of schools already in operation, but it was actively seeking out additional information on
where education was still lacking.
Indeed, the Bureau’s structure enabled this flexible, differentiated response to the needs of different districts. As a result, how
the Bureau approached school establishment and support varied
by district. The Bureau did purchase and maintain ownership
over a number of school buildings throughout the South.154 However, the Bureau also worked to support existing schools by, for

149 See, e.g., BUREAU OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS, ABSTRACT
REPORTS OF STATE SUPERINTENDENTS FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1866 (1866), microformed on Records of the Education Division, Roll 33.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 Black, supra note 83, at 1065–66.
153 BUREAU OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS, REPORT OF THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, BUREAU R., F. & A.L., STATE OF ALABAMA, FOR THE
MONTH OF JULY 1869 (1869), microformed on Records of the Education Division, Roll 15.
154 They kept detailed records on this aspect of their work as well. See, e.g., BUREAU
OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS, REPORT OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS OWNED
BY BUREAU R., F. & A.L. AND BY OTHER PARTIES ENGAGED IN THE EDUCATION OF
FREEDMEN, IN THE STATE OF ALABAMA MONTH OF JUNE 1870 (1870), microformed on Records of the Education Division, Roll 15.
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example, assigning and transporting teachers.155 Moreover, in areas where schools were few or insufficient to match the local need,
Bureau agents reached out to what they termed “benevolent organizations”—essentially, private aid organizations—to use their
resources to set up schools.156 This was no one-size-fits-all approach to education. Instead, the Bureau was coordinating with
and adapting to local educational conditions. With this adaptive
framework, the Bureau’s educational reach expanded.
The Bureau’s structure and recordkeeping enabled it to track
and expand literacy education to areas where state governments
were unable or unwilling to do so. This is itself evidence of the
federal government’s role in ensuring access to literacy education.
As Part II.A.2 details, though, the Bureau’s increasing educational outreach during this time was made possible by Congress,
who codified and supported that educational mission. This support allowed the Bureau to last for as long as it did and elevate
its educational mission.
2. The longevity and positioning of the Bureau’s
educational mission.
The Bureau’s tenure and role was in jeopardy at multiple
points throughout the Reconstruction Era, but the educational
mission nevertheless remained a consistently critical part of the
Bureau’s operation. In 1866, with the Bureau’s initial yearlong
tenure set to expire, Congress passed the Freedmen’s Bureau Act
of 1866.157 Unlike the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, the 1866 Act
provided more detail on the exact operations of the Bureau, including an explicit codification of the Bureau’s educational mission.
A notable opponent of both the Freedmen’s Bureau and the
codification of its educational role was President Andrew Johnson. On February 19, 1866, to the surprise of many in Congress,158
President Johnson vetoed the bill. Among his many reservations
was that Congress had “never founded schools for any class of our
own people . . . but has left the care of education to the much more
competent and efficient control of the States, of communities, of

155 See African Americans and Education During Reconstruction: The Tolson’s Chapel
Schools, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://perma.cc/6BQ2-QLZY (last updated Oct. 6, 2020).
156 See id.
157 Ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173.
158 Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1361, 1367 (2016).
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private associations, and of individuals.”159 Yet President Johnson’s contempt for federal involvement in state provision of education neither doomed the Bureau nor its educational mission.
True, Congress did amend the bill in response to President Johnson’s veto, but the amended bill reached the President on July 3,
1866 with the following provision intact:
That the commissioner of this bureau shall at all times cooperate with private benevolent associations of citizens in aid
of freedmen, and with agents and teachers, duly accredited
and appointed by them, and shall hire or provide by lease
buildings for purposes of education whenever such associations shall, without cost to the government, provide suitable
teachers and means of instruction, and he shall furnish such
protection as may be required for the safe conduct of such
schools.160
President Johnson once again vetoed the bill, but this time,
Congress had enough votes to override his veto.161 By overriding
the veto, Congress ensured the codification of the Bureau’s mission and symbolically expressed that mission’s importance. After
all, removing any reference to the Bureau’s educational mission
would have been responsive to the President’s concerns. Congress
could have sacrificed the Bureau’s educational role in order to
preserve other portions of the bill. However, Congress retained
this textual commitment to education, solidifying the Bureau’s role
in promoting and ensuring educational access during Reconstruction.
Of course, one may wonder whether President Johnson’s response undermines the notion that the right to a basic minimum
education is deeply rooted. While the President—an admittedly
key piece of the federal government—may have attempted to
quash this bill and the Bureau’s educational mission, Congress’s
response is crucial here. That is because it is Congress, not the
President, that has a role in constitutional amendments.162 Thus,
it is their actions that speak most clearly to the question whether
a right to some education under that amendment is deeply rooted.

159

Andrew Johnson, Veto Message to the Senate (Feb. 19, 1866), in VETO MESSAGES

OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE ACTION OF CONGRESS THEREON 289,

292 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1886).
160 Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 § 13, 14 Stat. at 176.
161 Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866, U.S. SENATE, https://perma.cc/C8Q9
-YDBT.
162 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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In 1868, the tenure of the Freedmen’s Bureau was once again
up for debate. This time, Congress clarified an exit strategy for
the Bureau. The Act of July 16, 1868, provided “[t]hat it shall be
the duty of the Secretary of War to discontinue the operations of
the bureau in any State whenever such State shall be fully restored in its constitutional relations with the government of the
United States, and shall be duly represented in the Congress.”163
This language reflected a growing movement by southern states
to return to their prerebellion status. The Act provided however
“[t]hat the educational division of said bureau shall not be affected, or in any way interfered with, until such State shall have
made suitable provision for the education of the children of freedmen within said State.”164 Indeed, even as the federal government
set about establishing ways for the rebel states to regain independent control of their respective states, the federal government
explicitly maintained their ability to ensure that some education
was provided for. This treatment was distinct from other functions the Bureau carried out. For example, medical aid, provision
of clothing, and efforts at obtaining housing for formerly enslaved
people were scrapped far earlier on in the Bureau’s lifespan.165 Yet
the educational mission received continued and, seemingly,
greater support over the course of the Bureau’s operations. This
support is indicative that the same Congress that ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment prioritized education as key to states’ operation in the aftermath of the Civil War.
This requirement that southern states retain the Bureau until education was sufficiently provided for fits nicely within
Black’s account of that same Congress. He emphasized Congress’s
requirement that states introduce education provisions into their
constitutions in order to be readmitted to the Union.166 Providing
for education suggests that it is important; premising independence from federal intervention on education suggests it is critical
to the functioning of an independent state. Additionally, bear in
mind that southern states faced a host of readmission criteria,
including ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.167 Putting
these pieces together, in order for the states in the former

163

Act of July 6, 1868, ch. 135, § 2, 15 Stat. 83, 83.
Act of July 6, 1868 § 2, 15 Stat. at 83.
165 Compare Act of July 6, 1868 § 2, 15 Stat. at 83, with Freedmen’s Bureau Act of
1866 § 5, 14 Stat. at 174, and Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865 §§ 2, 4, 13, 13 Stat. at 508.
166 Black, supra note 83, at 1063.
167 See Landmark Legislation: The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 115.
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Confederacy to rejoin the United States and regain Bureau-less
control over their soil, they had to ratify and agree to provide education to all citizens. Because the Bureau’s exit could only occur
after the state had already ratified the amendment and placed an
educational provision in its constitution, the notion that the
amendment protects educational access has deep roots.
This first case study already provides key evidence that the
right to a basic minimum education is deeply rooted. As a postwar transition agency, the Bureau was a federal entity designed
to support primarily Black citizens. The Bureau viewed their mission as preparing these “new” citizens to participate fully in democratic society. A key part of executing that mission was supporting the establishment of schools, as educating Black people while
they were enslaved was illegal in much of the antebellum South.
Those schools in turn prioritized literacy, and in reporting on the
progress of those schools, the Bureau prioritized literacy as well.
This educational role of the Bureau was crucial. Its importance
was reflected in the duration of the Bureau’s educational capacity, even persisting through a presidential veto. Moreover, as the
federal government looked to readmit rebel states into the United
States, the Bureau’s educational function remained statutorily
authorized until the state could properly educate its entire citizenry. This requirement dovetailed other readmission criteria, including the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the inclusion of an educational provision in each state’s constitution.
In this way, the federal government ensured access to a basic
minimum education. As a result, this case study supports that the
right to a basic minimum education has deep, enactment-focused
roots.
B. The Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Compulsory Boarding Schools
Turning to the second case study, a similar pattern of federal
intervention emerges. Part III.B focuses on the federal actions behind the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ compulsory boarding schools
for indigenous youths. In sharp contrast to the Freedmen’s Bureau’s relatively short lifespan, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was
created in 1824, decades before the Civil War and Reconstruction.168 Like the Freedmen’s Bureau, it too was an outgrowth of

168
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the office of the Secretary of War.169 Unlike the Freedmen’s Bureau, education was not an initial primary concern of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. In fact, Congress did not begin appropriating
money “expressly for the purpose of Indian education” until
1877.170 The push for federal funding for indigenous children came
in response to recognition that the education provided by the day
schools on reservations—some run by tribes and some run by private organizations—were failing to address the so-called “Indian
problem.”171 Essentially, federal officials feared that indigenous
children were not learning “proper” values and skills. This Section explores how the architects of these schools used literacy education in order to remedy that perceived problem.
To properly investigate this case study, this Section proceeds
as follows. Part III.B.1 describes early federal education commitments to indigenous people, explores the changing legal status of
indigenous people during the nineteenth century, and explains
how those changes impact the analysis of literacy education’s
historical roots. Part III.B.2 then dives into the structure of these
schools and the degree to which literacy received emphasis.
1. Education and the changing legal status of indigenous
people.
Like the Bureau of Indian Affairs itself, educational commitments to indigenous people did not begin in the 1860s or 1870s.
Federal commitments to the education of indigenous children can
be traced far before the Reconstruction Era. Indeed, “the United
States pledged to provide a suitable education for the American
Indian peoples” in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.172
By 1871, just three years after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States had ratified more than 110
treaties that promised some amount of education to indigenous
children.173 Originally, many tribal leaders envisioned an education that merged the values of a given tribe with education in literacy, mathematics, and the arts.174 However, federal officials
169

Id.
DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND
THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928, at 26–27 (1995).
171 Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the Nation’s Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 952 (1999).
172 Id. at 950.
173 See DAVID. H. DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST: A HISTORY OF INDIAN EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (1993).
174 Cross, supra note 171, at 950–52.
170
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scrapped these plans and constructed an educational project that
was far more “authoritarian.”175
To understand why this shift occurred, it is critical to understand that the legal status of indigenous people changed dramatically over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
At the nation’s Founding, their legal status was something close
to that of independent nations whose lands largely lay beyond the
borders of the original thirteen states.176 However, in a series of
Supreme Court decisions—the so-called “Marshall Trilogy”—the
Court undermined that conceptualization, declaring that indigenous tribes held no title to their land and for the first time described them as akin to wards.177 This ward conception gained
traction over the course of the 1800s,178 particularly among those
involved in indigenous children’s education.179
The changing legal status of indigenous people during this
time makes analyzing the federal government’s creation of compulsory boarding schools especially intriguing. With the conception of indigenous children and the tribes they were a part of as
“wards,” there are two conflicting roads of analysis one could take.
First, one could say that the wardship status shifts the role of the
federal government such that it drove the federal government to
do more than it would otherwise. In other words, because wardship is such a dependent state, federal officials’ actions do not reflect what they believed to be necessary for a functioning society
but instead was something they thought would just be beneficial
to this special class of people. Essentially, this argument requires
assuming that these educational programs are products of benevolence or pity rather than perceived necessity. Besides the host of
problems that accompany assuming such motivations on behalf of
the architects of these schools, this attitude, to put it lightly, does
not track with the rest of the federal government’s interactions
with indigenous peoples in the nineteenth century.180
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Id. at 954.
Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 110–11 (1999).
177 Id. at 129–30.
178 For a discussion of this evolving “wardship” status, see generally Nancy Carol
Carter, Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardianship over American Indians: Land-Related Cases, 1887–1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197 (1976).
179 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 176, at 115–16.
180 For a sample of this treatment, see generally DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (2007).
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If the federal government was not going above and beyond,
that leaves an alternative. The federal government undertook a
federalized education program because federal officials believed
that program to be necessary for these children to function in “civilized” society. This notion tracks both with the government’s general policy toward indigenous peoples and with the expressed motivations of the program’s architects. For example, Merrill Gates,
a critical member of the indigenous children’s education movement, reflected: “Is not a guardian’s first duty so to educate and
care for his wards as to make them able to care for themselves?”181
He concluded, “We must not only offer them education, we must
force education upon them.”182 Through this forced education,
Gates and other proponents intended to “civilize” indigenous people, ultimately in order to prepare them for citizenship.183 These
officials’ insistence that cultural erasure was “necessary” is of
course false and deplorable. However, the insistence that education is necessary tracks with the federal government’s actions in
supporting the Freedmen’s Bureau in the American South.
One could argue that the unique legal status of indigenous
people during this period renders this case study particularly illsuited to a conversation about what the Fourteenth Amendment
protects because the Amendment was not interpreted to change
the legal status of Native Americans into citizens.184 Thus, because indigenous people did not receive universal citizenship until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,185 the argument would be
that these federal educational initiatives cannot speak to what
the Fourteenth Amendment protects. This argument misses two
key points. First, while the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924
granted citizenship to all Native Americans, the vast majority
were already U.S. citizens through other avenues.186 Thus, to say
the Fourteenth Amendment only came into play for indigenous
people in 1924 is inaccurate. Second and more importantly, education was seen as a key step in preparing indigenous people to
become citizens and thus clearly protected by the Fourteenth
181 Merrill E. Gates, Land and Law as Agents in Educating Indians, in H.R. Doc.
No. 109, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS, THE
YEAR 1885 (1886), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE
“FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN,” 1880–1900, at 46 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973).
182 Id. at 46, 52.
183 See Porter, supra note 176, at 115–23.
184 See id. at 133–34, 136.
185 Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253.
186 Id. at 124.
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Amendment. As Thomas Morgan, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1889 to 1893, summarized the role of this federal program years after its inception, “[t]he great purpose which the
Government has in view in providing an ample system of common
school education for all Indian youth . . . is the preparation of
them for American citizenship.”187 Because education was seen as
necessary to make indigenous people citizens—and thereby
clearly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment—the Bureau of
Indian Affairs’ educational efforts remain a critical case study of
federal education action around the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enactment.
The changing legal status of indigenous people during the
nineteenth century is important context to this case study. It explains why federal attitudes toward indigenous children’s education shifted from the Founding to the 1870s. This context is important, and if anything, it makes this case study even more
worthy of attention. The federal government saw its mission as
preparing its wards for U.S. citizenship. As Part III.B.2 now explores, that preparation always involved basic literacy education.
2. Literacy’s role in compulsory boarding schools.
Literacy featured prominently in the federal government’s
compulsory schools because of the perceived link between literacy
and civilized society. As the U.S. commissioner of education would
describe the educational mission of these schools years after their
founding, the schools would “give [indigenous children] letters,
and make them acquainted with the printed page. . . . With these
comes the great emancipation, and the school shall give [ ]
that.”188 The resulting compulsory boarding schools had a varied
curriculum, but literacy featured prominently throughout the
day. Indeed, the school day was half directed at traditional elementary education—the so-called three “Rs” of reading, ’riting,
and ’rithmetic—and half directed at values and vocational education.189 The time devoted to traditional school subjects focused
187 Thomas J. Morgan, Instructions to Indian Agents in Regard to Inculcation of Patriotism in Indian Schools, in H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 51-1, pt. 5, at clxvii (1890), reprinted in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 181, at 257.
188 W.T. HARRIS, THE RELATION OF SCHOOL EDUCATION TO THE WORK OF CIVILIZING
OTHER RACES (1895), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN 33, 37 (Isabel C. Barrows
ed., Boston, The Lake Mohonk Conference 1896).
189 See Jon Reyhner, American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What Is
Going Right?, 57 J. AM. INDIAN EDUC. 58, 60 (2018).
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heavily on literacy.190 Students were continually asked to read
aloud from textbooks or readers, sometimes in unison and sometimes alone before the entire class.191
Outside of class, the importance of literacy was reinforced
through the production of school newspapers, which featured student compositions and highlighted student achievements.192 The
schools in turn distributed these newspapers to the student body
as well as to subscribers around the country.193 These newspapers
functioned as not only a means of highlighting educational
achievement, but as a forum for school staff to reinforce the importance of literacy. Indeed, one boarding school administrator
went so far as to write an entire novella, Stiya: Or, A Carlisle Indian Girl at Home,194 that was originally published in one of these
newspapers.195 That novella told the story of Stiya, the ideal indigenous student, who returns home to her family after attending
one of these boarding schools and transforms her family home
into a middle-class domestic paradise.196 She achieves this—in a
rather meta twist—by reading and referring to her copies of her
school’s newspaper, which she “kept so carefully” in her trunk “between two pasteboard box covers.”197 Upon unpacking these papers back at home, Stiya experiences immediate relief, kissing
and “talking to [the newspapers] as though they were a person.”198
She then recounts: “I sat down by the fire, and for an hour lost
myself reading over what we had done at Carlisle [Indian Industrial School] in years gone by.”199
In this way, Stiya embodied both the importance of literary
education to school officials and the reason why reading received
so much emphasis. To them, reading enabled students to both
fully engage in society and assimilate their family and homes into
that society.

190 See Sarah Klotz, Impossible Rhetorics of Survivance at the Carlisle School, 1879–
1883, 69 COLL. COMPOSITION & COMMC’N, 208, 212 (2017) (placing “the boarding school
project within a long history of literacy training as settler colonialism in North America”
(emphasis in original)); see also ADAMS, supra note 170, at 137.
191 See ADAMS, supra note 170, at 137–38.
192 See Klotz, supra note 190, at 212–13.
193 Id. at 213.
194 EMBE, STIYA, A CARLISLE INDIAN GIRL AT HOME (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1891).
195 Amanda J. Zink, Carlisle’s Writing Circle: Boarding School Texts and the Decolonization of Domesticity, 27 STUD. IN AM. INDIAN LITERATURES 37, 37 (2015).
196 Id. at 37–38.
197 EMBE, supra note 194, at 108.
198 Id.
199 Id.
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Because school officials deemed reading to be so critical in
this process, they attached severe consequences to seemingly minor reading stumbles. For example, when students failed to read
a passage aloud correctly, students could expect harsh critiques
and even discipline from their instructors.200 In addition, those
same student newspapers that highlighted student work and faculty fiction also published articles shaming students who failed to
keep pace in the classroom.201 To proponents of these schools, this
harsh approach to learning literacy was deemed necessary to “civilizing” and “assimilating” indigenous children.202 While these
harsh consequences evidence the priority these federal schools
placed on literacy, the abhorrent and problematic thinking underpinning those consequences—and school officials’ actions more
generally—merits considerable discussion. Part IV engages
deeply in that discussion.
Before that discussion begins, it is worthwhile to take stock
of the federal government’s behavior in this context. The federal
government saw education as a key step in making indigenous
people U.S. citizens. When the federal government perceived a
failure in educational provision of local schools on reservations,
they responded with a federal program of schools. Much like the
Southern schools supported by the Freedmen’s Bureau, these
schools prioritized literacy. Through literacy, the architects of
these schools hoped to prepare students and their families for
U.S. citizenship. This pattern of thinking and action maps closely
onto the cycle of behavior the federal government displayed
through the Freedmen’s Bureau’s educational projects.
IV. CASE STUDIES IN CONVERSATION
With an understanding of how each case study speaks to the
deep roots of a right to a basic minimum education, it is now time
to bring those case studies into conversation with each other.
While the actions undertaken by the Freedmen’s Bureau and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs bear many similarities to one another,
one similarity requires discussion first and foremost: both of these
programs are inextricable from the colonialist motivations that
underpin them. Part IV.A wrestles with this similarity. After unpacking these programs’ motivations, Part IV.A goes on to

200
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explain how these motivations impact a proposed right to a basic
minimum education. Finally, Part IV.B concludes by showing
that these programs—though problematically motivated—ultimately support the notion that the right to a basic minimum education has deep roots.
A. The Colonialist Motivations Behind Federal Action
The colonialism behind the actions of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Freedmen’s Bureau is unmistakable. Consider
first the compulsory boarding schools for indigenous children. The
principal motivations behind these schools are hardly difficult to
discern. With a stated goal of “[k]ill[ing] the Indian in him, and
sav[ing] the man,”203 the racism underpinning the creation of
these schools was obvious and central. Children were not only discouraged from speaking in their native language or acknowledging their culture, but teachers also actively disciplined students
for doing so. Descriptions of these disciplinary measures are
deeply disturbing. One teacher wrote in her memoir about a time
she forced her thirty-five kindergarten students to lay on tables
“like little sardines” and spanked them in this fashion for speaking their native Mohave language.204 Yet actions just like these
received praise from school officials for teaching indigenous children how to “speak properly” and assimilate into white culture.
The resulting trauma to students is well documented.205
With a much more complicated legacy, the Freedmen’s Bureau has received both praise and critique for its operations.
Praise derives from the Bureau’s position of often working against
the racism and revanchism in the postwar South. Popular websites laud the Bureau as a triumph through characterizations like
the following: “During its years of operation, the Freedmen’s Bureau fed millions of people, built hospitals and provided medical
aid, negotiated labor contracts for ex-slaves and settled labor disputes. It also helped former slaves legalize marriages and locate
lost relatives, and assisted black veterans.”206 Unsurprisingly
though, historical scholarship complicates any narrative that the

203 RICHARD H. PRATT, THE ADVANTAGES OF MINGLING INDIANS WITH WHITES (1892),
reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 181, at 260–61; see also
ADAMS, supra note 170, at 52.
204 ADAMS, supra note 170, at 141 (quotation marks omitted).
205 See generally Lori V. Quigley, Thomas Indian School Social Experiment Resulting
in Traumatic Effects, 14 JUD. NOTICE 48 (2019).
206 Freedmen’s Bureau, supra note 141.
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Bureau operated as an instrument of pure altruism. Agents and
architects of the Bureau’s programs often admitted motivations
and biases comparable in their racial paternalism to the education of indigenous children.207 They expressed concern, for example, that Black citizens inherently lacked important moral values
like integrity and hard work.208
No part of examining these actions should be equated with
absolving these federal officials from their condemnable motivations and actions. A narrative suggesting that these actions were
purely the products of altruism or even attempts at reparation
would be deeply flawed. The point of examining these actions is
not to praise the federal government. The point of examining
these actions is to show that the federal government deemed education to be essential, so much so that it expended time on the
Congress floor, dedicated resources from the national budget, and
premised independent statehood on literacy education. It did so
because it perceived that the states and private organizations had
failed. These actions placed the federal government in such a position that it essentially served as a backstop, ensuring that
where local educational provision failed, literacy education could
still occur.
Of course, the colonialism underpinning these programs may
lead one to think that these programs were not truly educational
initiatives and rather that they were assimilationist and racist
programs. The complicated, messy reality is that they were a bit
of both. True, the reason that Congress and federal agents undertook these missions was based on problematic assumptions. In
both case studies, they assumed in one form or another that people of color innately lacked the ability to engage in democratic society. These assumptions are obviously wrong. Yet, the programs
federal officials created—while undeniably operating with these
biases—were programs that prioritized educational provision,
specifically where local actors had failed to do so. The reasoning
behind these programs is unquestionably important and should
under no circumstances be erased from accounts of these actions.
But it is the actions the federal government took that define
whether they protected a right to a basic minimum education. In
the case of both the Freedmen’s Bureau and the Bureau of Indian
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Affairs, they did in fact protect and support educational access to
literacy.
Bad motivations can and do beget law that ultimately receives
modern approval under a different rationale. Take, for example,
worker protection laws like those establishing a minimum wage.
The history of minimum wage laws can be traced to beliefs in the
inherent inferiority of women.209 Yet, today, these laws are a given
in modern American life with a federal minimum wage as well as
state minimum wage laws in all but five states.210 Similarly, a
right to a basic minimum education can have roots in federal actions that are imbued with problematic assumptions and motivations but ultimately function in a new way. Those roots cannot
and should not be ignored or swept away. Yet while a right to
education will share a history with those motivations, it need not
be defined by them. In fact, that right could actively subvert the
systemic educational inequality that resulted from very similar
thinking.
With this notion in mind, the remainder of this Part discusses
the role that the federal government ultimately assumed at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment and how that
bears on the question of whether foundational literacy education
is deeply rooted in U.S. history and tradition.
B. The Deep Roots of the Right to a Basic Minimum Education
With the understanding of a right to a basic minimum education as at least a right to some foundational level of literacy,
this right has deep roots within the federal government around the
time of the enactment. Indeed, the federal government at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment effectively positioned
itself as an ensurer of access to literacy instruction in areas where
that access was believed to be extremely lacking or nonexistent.
First, consider the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Congress that
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment is the same Congress that
passed the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, codifying the Bureau’s
educational mission over the concerns of the president. In fact,
after President Johnson’s first veto, Congress put the bill on hold
in order to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. This is the same

209 See Raymund Munts & David C. Rice, Women Workers: Protection or Equality?, 24
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Congress that—despite President Johnson’s disapproval of the
Bureau’s educational goals—codified that educational role regardless. When it came time to disband the Bureau, exiting a
given state was made dependent on the status of its educational
system. Both in supporting the establishment of schools and in
making their operation a prerequisite of unencumbered statehood, the federal government expanded opportunities to access
literacy education.
One may argue that these programs are not truly evidence of
a right to a basic minimum education, but rather they are a policy
response to the extraordinary circumstances of the Civil War and
Reconstruction. This argument might have more credence if the
federal government ceased its educational involvement after Reconstruction ended. But it didn’t. Federal boarding schools still
exist today,211 and federal involvement in education has only increased since the Reconstruction Era.212 It is also worth noting
that this argument renders an enactment-era focus of this historical analysis effectively self-destructive. Surely, one cannot
demonstrate that something is not a momentary policy response
without looking to what happened after the relevant moment
ends. Thus, to the extent this critique is lodged at right-to-education
advocates, it is truly a critique of enactment-focused methodology
rather than a critique of the Freedmen’s Bureau or the Bureau of
Indian Affairs specifically.
One may also argue that the federal government’s focus on
the South undercuts any argument that it assumed a role in ensuring educational access. However, this ignores the fact that the
concentration of efforts in the South responded to an obvious
need. Prior to the Civil War, many southern states made it a
crime to teach enslaved people to read.213 With the Union victory,
the South presented a place where minimum amounts of education were patently unavailable.
Moreover, the Freedmen’s Bureau was not the only example
of the federal government engaging in this type of behavior. In
devising compulsory schools for indigenous children, the federal
government engaged in a similar cycle of behavior. It assessed the
current state of education and determined it was lacking. In response, it used federal funds to create schools to address the
211
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perceived gap.214 These schools prioritized literacy as a fundamental necessity of American society.
These case studies and the cycle of federal behavior that they
both share mean that the federal government has a history of ensuring access to a minimum amount of education—specifically,
basic literacy education—when it determines that local entities
have failed. This history is directly from the period of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment and thus supports the notion
that the right to a basic minimum education has deep roots in our
nation’s history.
Bringing this support in conversation with other scholarship,
the historical roots of a right to a basic minimum education
abound. As this Comment addresses, the very notion of the federal government as a backstop to local educational failure has
deep roots at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment.
This conclusion buttresses other findings about education’s history,
from the right’s inclusion in nearly every state constitution to the
relationship between those education provisions and readmission
to the Union. Moreover, this mountain of evidence is just a small
drop in the bucket if one embraces an expansive view of the historical prong, bringing in evidence like the advent of compulsory
schooling and the early twentieth-century Supreme Court precedent discussed in Part I.A—as the Sixth Circuit did in Gary B.215
Thus, under either methodology, there is considerable evidence
that the right to a basic minimum education is deeply rooted in
U.S. history and tradition.
With considerable support for the right’s deep roots under
both of the prong’s analytical frameworks, advocates for such a
right have multiple avenues of making their case. While advocates still must convince judges that the right is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and carefully described, a recognized
right may be closer than it appears.
CONCLUSION
Scholarship about a right to education has long been sidelined as fantastical theory rather than adopted by courts. After
all, the Supreme Court explicitly foreclosed a broad, general right
to education under the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet scholars and
courts have acknowledged that the Court left open the question
214
215
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whether a right to some minimum amount of education exists.
And indeed, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Gary B.—albeit shortlived—has demonstrated that arguments for this right’s recognition are not meritless. If a federal court of appeals can reach this
conclusion, it is no longer fantasy to think that other courts might
follow suit.
The path to a recognized right certainly contains obstacles.
One key issue that advocates will have to wrestle with is the historical prong of substantive due process analysis. While judges
today differ in how they analyze whether a proposed right is
deeply rooted in U.S. history and tradition—from an expansive
analytical approach to an enactment-focused one—the importance of identifying and analyzing those roots around the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment is the same. Previous
scholarship highlights important evidence from state constitutions and constitutional conventions, arguing that the pervasive
discussions and guarantees of education in these sources indicate
that the right is deeply rooted. Critically however, these statefocused pieces of evidence are not the only support available for
this notion. Indeed, the federal government’s actions in supporting the Freedmen’s Bureau’s educational operations and the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ compulsory boarding schools for indigenous children both stand as distinct, interrelated examples of the
government prioritizing, providing, and protecting literacy education as a necessity.
In both cases, the federal government assessed the state of
education in a region, decided it was deeply lacking, and took it
upon itself to establish or support the establishment of schools to
address that issue. True, the government did not establish a federal system of public schools for all children. Instead, the government responded to areas it identified as high need by acting to
ensure that at least some access to education existed. This education always included a literacy component. This positioning of education as a protected necessity is evidence that even when limiting one’s evidence to around the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification and enactment, the right to a basic
minimum education is deeply rooted in U.S. history and tradition.
Importantly, even if courts hold that the right to a basic minimum education is deeply rooted, additional requirements must
be shown before that right could be recognized. Per the Supreme
Court’s articulation of substantive due process analysis in Glucksberg, the asserted right to education must still be carefully
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described.216 The right must also be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.”217 Whether the right to a basic minimum
education satisfies these additional requirements is beyond the
scope of this Comment.218 However, it is worth noting that scholarship already links literacy’s importance to exercising key liberties like voting.219 Moreover, defining a basic minimum education
as a right to a foundational level of literacy is considerably narrower than the broad “right to education” presented in Rodriguez.
In this way, advocates have plenty of room to argue that this right
meets the additional criteria.
In the midst of all this theoretical uncertainty regarding
whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right to a basic
minimum education, one fact is certain. The U.S. education system is failing to provide fundamental skills like reading, especially to the most marginalized Americans.220 Recognizing a right
to a basic minimum education is no silver bullet; even if such
a right is recognized and protected, systemic problems remain
embedded within the education system’s core.221 That being said,
with the recognition of a right to a basic minimum education, the
nation could move one step closer to protecting its citizens from a
lack of access to a foundational level of literacy. To act as an ensurer of educational access is something of no small significance
and may cause some federal officials to worry that the federal government is ill-equipped for such a role. But these officials can rest
assured that this is something the federal government has—in
one form or another—done before.
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